Introduction
As a newly established, supranational court deciding on human rights in a highly diverse and ever-widening Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) fi nds itself in a diffi cult position. Over the last sixty years, the Court has had to create a set of argumentation techniques and a judicial discourse that would be acceptable to all the Council's states parties and would be compatible with a variety of legal systems and legal traditions. It has had to navigate carefully between the aim of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) -the effective protection of fundamental rights -and the need to respect national traditions and sensitivities. It has had to thread its way, as well, between the need to protect individuals against fundamental rights violations and the need to provide suffi cient clarity as to the general scope and meaning of the Convention.
In general, the ECtHR has performed admirably in steering a middle course among these confl icting needs and obligations.
1 Nonetheless, the Court's bifurcation as seriously as it should. In many cases it either ignores the fi rst, defi nitional stage (or confi nes itself merely to noting the applicability of the Convention) 3 or merges the two stages of fundamental rights review into a single test. 4 In this paper, we will highlight some of the problematic consequences of the ECtHR's approach to the structure of fundamental rights. It is important to do so, since the way the Court deals with the structure of fundamental rights strongly infl uences the interpretation and application of the Convention by national courts. Structural faults and defi cits thus may be multiplied in national cases that never reach Strasbourg. In the end, this may hamper the effectiveness of the Convention system and limit the protection offered to individual citizens.
To support this argument, we will fi rst discuss a number of theoretical aspects of the distinction between defi nition and application (section 2). In section 3, we will provide an overview of the case law of the Court in which it either pays little or no attention to the scope of the right at stake or else merges the stages of defi nition and justifi cation into a single test. In section 4, we will argue that this case law has a number of problematic consequences as regards the clarity of the Court's case law (4.2), the division of the burden of proof (4.3), and the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine (4.4). Finally, we will submit that a more structured approach toward the scope and defi nition of Convention rights may help to avoid or solve these problems (section 5).
As a preliminary to this paper it is important to note that we will focus on Convention rights that are not absolute in character. Some of the rights contained in the Convention, such as article 3 (the prohibition of torture) or article 7 ( nulla poene sine lege priori ), are nonderogable or can be limited only in the rarest of circumstances. The need for the defi nition of the scope of protection of such provisions is of great importance, since no justifi cation or balancing operation is possible once an interference with these rights has been established.
criminal conviction, the seizure and subsequent forfeiture and destruction of the matrix and of hundreds of copies of the Schoolbook -were without any doubt, and the Government did not deny it, ' interferences by public authority ' in the exercise of his freedom of expression which is guaranteed by paragraph 1 of the text cited above. Such interferences entail a ' violation ' of article 10 if they do not fall within one of the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2, which is accordingly of decisive importance in this case. " In later cases, it has stressed the importance of the bifurcation by using headings; it did this for the fi rst time in the case of Young, James, and Webster: " 1. The existence of an interference with an article 11 right " and " 2. The existence of a justifi cation for the interference found by the Court " (Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) ).
The debate surrounding nonderogable rights and the hidden possibilities for limitation of these rights is very different from the debate regarding the structure of judicial review of interferences with nonabsolute rights. This renders the case law about nonderogable rights less material from the perspective chosen in this paper. For that reason, this case law will not be discussed.
The structure of fundamental rights -Theoretical issues

The need to distinguish different stages of review
According to many legal scholars and judges, it is important, almost selfevident to distinguish between at least two elements or stages of review in cases focused on derogable fundamental rights. 5 First, the body of facts presented by an individual applicant must establish that an interference with an expressly protected right has occurred. 6 A prima facie case of infringement of a fundamental right is established thereby. Such a prima facie case of infringement usually does not suffi ce, by itself, to support the decision that the interference constitutes a breach or a violation of a fundamental right. This would be true only if fundamental rights were considered to be absolute in character, which means that they would provide full and unlimited protection against all government interference as soon as they apply. It is generally accepted, however, that limitations of fundamental rights can be justifi ed by convincing and important general interests or by the need to protect a confl icting individual 5 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Governmental Interests: Madisonian Principles 3 -5 (1979) (stating that the two separate stages of review " are elementary, standard propositions which should not need stating because they are such as everyone would assent to in principle " ). 6 In this respect, it may be maintained that the fi rst stage of fundamental review actually consists of two separate elements, i.e., the defi nition of the scope of the right and the establishment of a concrete interference with that right in the case under scrutiny ( see also V AN DER S CHYFF , supra note 5, at 41). The European Court also tends to make this distinction in its case law, examining the issue of whether there has been an interference with the Convention on its own. There are some problems of conceptual confusion in this case law too, as is visible in the case of Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek , in which the Court used elements of the application test (namely the question whether there was a suffi ciently serious interference, which was decided on basis of the availability of alternatives to the applicants) in deciding whether the claim attracted the protection of article 9 of the Convention (Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § § 78 -84). The question of interference with the Convention certainly requires attention but lies outside the scope of this paper, which has as its main focus the issue of the defi nition of the Convention's scope in relation to the application of Convention rights.
right. 7 A defi nitive conclusion about the alleged violation can be reached only when the soundness of the justifi cation adduced by the government has been scrutinized.
Although this two-part structure of fundamental rights is widely recognized, its importance for judicial review is sometimes questioned. This is especially true with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights. 8 In his important book about the Convention, Steven Greer has stated that " the Court has the ultimate constitutional responsibility for determining what each right means . . . .
[W]hether this process is described as ' defi ning ' vague rights more precisely, ' determining their scope ' , or ' balancing ' one right against the other, matters less than the recognition that there is no scope for genuine domestic discretion concerning how the rights themselves should be understood. "
9 In a similar fashion, Franz Matscher and George Letsas generally have classifi ed such diverse argumentative methods as teleological interpretation, margin of appreciation, and proportionality review as " methods of interpretation " of the Convention.
10 If this perspective is taken, the distinction between defi nition and application does not really matter, nor is there any need to distinguish between classic argumentation techniques concerning the defi nition of rights (such as textual and teleological interpretation) and techniques that are mainly used to examine the justifi cation for an interference (such as proportionality review and the margin of appreciation doctrine). Interpretation of the Convention is thus regarded as a conglomerate of judicial decision making where only the fi nal result counts.
11
7 Some rights, such as the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (article 3 of the Convention) and the principle of nulla crimen sine lege priori (article 7 of the Convention), are considered to be absolute. In those cases, no limitations are possible; as explained in section 1, however, these nonderogable rights will not be discussed in this paper. 8 Although, as has been mentioned above, the Court itself usually starts from the assumption that the bifurcation does matter. 47, 57 (2005) (regarding the margin of appreciation doctrine as an interpretative tool that " allows the Court to draw a line around core rights, " thus not clearly distinguishing between defi ning and limiting fundamental rights). By contrast, G REER criticizes the Court for its unstructured approach and the indistinct way in which it uses " a dozen or so " interpretative principles ( supra note 9, at 696). Although G REER does not (like L ETSAS and Matscher) make any clear distinction between principles and methods concerning the defi nition of scope and principles and methods relating to the test of justifi cation, he does seem to accept that a distinction between the two stages must be made.
11 Matscher, supra note 11; L ETSAS , supra note 11.
The doctrinal approach toward the European Convention taken by authors such as Steven Greer, George Letsas, and Franz Matscher may be contrasted with the classical constitutional rights doctrine that has developed in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States. In the United States, for example, David Faigman has demonstrated that the distinction between the defi nition of the scope of rights and the possibilities for justifi cation is deeply embedded in the constitutional system, even though it is not always respected by the Supreme Court.
12 Similarly, the bifurcation is clearly visible in German constitutional doctrine, where German legal theorists such as Robert Alexy have argued that it is, structurally, an essential part of all fundamental constitutional rights.
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A number of reasons have been advanced for distinguishing between defi nition of scope and examination of justifi cation. Faigman has put particular weight on the respective values guiding the courts in the stages of defi nition of scope and of justifi cation. In his view, when defi ning fundamental rights, the guiding values should come from the constitution per se.
14 The value of constitutional protection of fundamental rights is that these rights and liberties are placed beyond the reach of majority forces, such as the legislature. The constitution operates as a bulwark against majority tyranny.
15 When defi ning the scope of a fundamental right the courts, therefore, should be guided only by the text and aims of the constitution, not by general interests as defi ned by the legislature.
16 By contrast, when applying fundamental rights to individual cases and scrutinizing the justifi cation advanced in defense of an interference, Faigman argues that the courts must be guided by values coming from the majoritarian forces. 17 The reason for this is that the " counter-majoritarian difficulty " (that is, the constitutional problem created by a nonelected court being authorized to strike down or correct democratically legitimized measures) imparts a presumptive validity to state action. 18 Whereas the courts must place the constitution in the forefront when defi ning individual rights, they have to step back when scrutinizing the limitation of these rights so as to respect the primacy of the legislature.
Alexy has grounded his argument for distinguishing between defi nition and application in more structural considerations. In Alexy's view, fundamental rights provisions typically have a " double aspect, " since they couple rules and principles. 19 The " rule " is the actual right as protected by the fundamental rights provisions, such as " everyone has the right to freedom of expression. " This formulation of the right would be a " complete rule " if it were limitless or nonderogable, because it would then be applicable without any need for the right to be balanced against any other norm or interest.
20 Moreover, the right would then have a rule-like character since it would enable each case to be solved by a simple form of subsumption. 21 However, Alexy proceeds to show that almost no limitless fundamental rights exist in practice, and that express or implicit limitation clauses call, usually, for a balance to be struck between the fundamental right at stake and one or more competing general interests. To that extent fundamental rights typically have the character of principles.
In this argument, it is inadequate to conceive of constitutional rights norms purely as rules or purely as principles.
22 Because of the difference in character of both aspects of fundamental rights, Alexy submits that it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the rule-like element and the principle-like element. We may add to this that the two distinct stages of review call for different judicial methods to be applied, precisely because of their difference in character. When examining whether a given set of facts comes within the scope of the freedom of expression, a court may apply the classic methods of interpretation of rules (such as textual and structural interpretation), while it must apply the typical methods of balancing in the context of scrutinizing the justifi cation.
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For this reason, the distinction between scope and justifi cation is of great importance.
The importance of the defi nitional stage-Wide or narrow defi nition of fundamental rights?
Although the theoretical arguments discussed in section 2.1 seem to demonstrate that there is good reason to take the distinction between scope and justifi cation seriously, something more may be said about the need for the defi nition of rights. Even if it is agreed that it is necessary to distinguish carefully between defi ning the terms of a fundamental right and examining the reasons advanced in justifi cation of an interference with the right, an important question arises concerning how courts should proceed when defi ning the scope of certain 19 A LEXY , supra note 13, at 84 -85. 20 Id.
21 Id .
22 Id. at 85 -86. 23 A LEXY himself argues that a wide conception of constitutional norms should be chosen, " in which everything which the relevant constitutional principle suggests should be protected falls within the scope of protection " (A LEXY , supra note 13, at 210). He leaves little room for " defi nitional balancing " or other ways to establish the scope and meaning of fundamental rights.
notions central to fundamental rights, such as " expression, " " religion, " or " private life. " After all, such concepts can be defi ned either rather broadly (encompassing a range of individual interests that might vary from the right not to be subject to unannounced nighttime searches to the right to walk one's dog on a nearby fi eld) or rather narrowly (limiting the scope of the right to what is considered its " core " ).
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A variety of reasons have been adduced in support of a narrow defi nition of fundamental rights. It has been argued, for example, that a broad interpretation of fundamental rights would disable the legislature in favor of the courts, which would be empowered, in many cases, to strike down unfavorable legislation that might interfere with individual rights. 25 In addition, the warning has been issued that a wide-ranging interpretation of fundamental rights could result in a fl ood of cases about fundamental rights and, thus, in an undesirable " fundamental rights-alisation " and constitutionalization of society.
26 Such constitutionalization would not only be problematic from the perspective of judicial caseload but it could also have the effect of giving more importance and infl uence to the courts. Especially when a wide scope given to rights could be combined with a broad interpretation of the limits of the right, it would be up to the courts to decide on the reasonableness of practically any action taken by the state. 27 The ensuing judicialization of the legal system might be considered a threat to classic balances of power.
The call for a narrow defi nition of fundamental rights has taken on particular relevance in the context in which the ECtHR hands down its judgments. If the widest possible interpretation of fundamental rights were chosen by this Court, it would have to examine national justifi cations and limitations in nearly any case brought before it. 28 This would not only be highly problematic because of the Court's enormous caseload but it would also put great pressure on the Court's already complex relationship with the national authorities. According to article 1 of the Convention, the latter have the primary responsibility to protect and respect fundamental rights. 29 The Court is called on to intervene only when it is clear that the national authorities have failed to live up to their responsibilities and have shown an obvious lack of respect for fundamental rights. As a result of the specifi c supranational situation, the Court has a doubly complicated constitutional position. 30 Just as national (constitutional) courts do, it must deal with the countermajoritarian diffi culty, which means that it must respect the democratic legitimacy of national legislative measures. In addition, it owes respect to the sovereignty of nation-states 31 -a respect more easily accorded if a narrow defi nition of fundamental rights is chosen. A narrow defi nition also means that national governments will not be asked to defend decisions and legislative acts that have only a tangential impact on the rights protected by the Convention. In this way, the Court need consider itself competent only to decide issues that truly concern fundamental rights and over which the exercise of supranational power would be appropriate.
Although a narrow defi nition of fundamental rights seems desirable for these reasons, often it has been stressed, as well, that a broad defi nition would be preferable. Aside from the general argument that the desire for effective protection of fundamental rights warrants a generous defi nition of such rights, 32 the argument has been made that a narrow defi nition could cause major problems with regard to the structural and conceptual distinction between scope and justifi cation. A narrow defi nition of the scope of fundamental rights might too easily invite a balancing of interests and of the elements of application, all of which could be introduced in the fi rst, defi nitional stage of review. 33 This risk has been stressed, in particular, by Alexy, who has supported the argument by the example of an artist who wants to paint on a busy intersection. 34 A broad reading of the right to freedom of artistic expression clearly suggests that the artist's right is protected by the relevant provision. It is hardly to be denied, after all, that painting (even if it is done on a busy intersection) is an artistic activity. By contrast, a narrow interpretation of the freedom of expression could mean that only those forms of artistic expression are covered that do not cause a threat to traffi c. The defi nition of the right is then made conditional on the governmental interest that is served by limiting the right to freedom of expression (that is, in the interest of guaranteeing traffi c safety), which means that the question of limitation or justifi cation is made part of the determination of the scope of the right. 35 Evidently, such an approach does not do justice to the important differences between defi nition and application or limitation that have been explained above. 36 For that reason, Alexy has rejected the narrow approach in favor of giving the widest possible scope to fundamental rights.
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It must be stressed, however, that the need to distinguish between scope and justifi cation does not demand the widest possible defi nitions of fundamental rights, nor does a narrow defi nition of fundamental rights necessitate the introduction of elements of justifi cation at the stage of defi nition. It is possible to use the classic methods of constitutional interpretation (textual, historical, teleological or purposive, structural or systematic) to exclude certain claims from the scope of protection of fundamental rights without resorting to balancing or without referring to specifi c governmental interests.
38 It can be reasoned, for example, on the basis of teleological arguments, that pure hate speech has nothing to do with the kind of rights protected by the ECHR and does not fi t in with the general aims of the Convention. No actual balancing exercise is required if notions such as " expression " or " private life " are defi ned with reference to the text of the Convention or with reference to its underlying principles and guiding values. After all, no concrete juxtaposition of individual interests against public or general interests is apparent if it is stated that, in light of the underlying goals of the Convention, hate speech cannot be regarded as protected speech under the Convention.
39 This is different from the example of the artist painting on a busy road junction, where such a juxtaposition is visible indeed, albeit rather covertly. The painter's activity is considered not to constitute a form of artistic expression because of the need to protect traffi c safety , not because of limitations inherent in the text of the Convention, its drafting history, or its underlying aims. This means that a clear and concrete public interest is covertly balanced against the freedom of expression; such balancing is a judicial activity that is only in its proper place in the second stage of the review. Judicial determination of scope as a matter of interpretation by means of classic canons of interpretation can thus be distinguished from application or examination of justifi cation. This means that it is not necessary to resort to the widest possible interpretation of fundamental rights in order to safeguard structurally correct judicial review.
Conclusion
We have explained, in this section, that it is desirable for theoretical reasons that the ECtHR make an effort to distinguish carefully between the defi nition of the scope of rights and the examination of the justifi cation for an interference with those rights. However, this does not automatically mean that the widest defi nition of rights should be given. The stage of the defi nition of scope would become rather empty if all individual interests, however far removed from the core of the right in question, were covered by the Convention. Instead, the determination of the scope of fundamental rights must be taken seriously so as to avoid having the Court become overburdened with cases that have little to do with fundamental rights. The challenge for the Court is to pay suffi cient attention to the defi nition of the rights contained in the Convention, without confusing elements of " pure " defi nition and elements of application (such as balancing of interests). In our view, the Court, thus far, has not truly met this challenge, as we will endeavor to show in the next section.
3. The structure of fundamental rights and the Strasbourg Court's case law
Introduction
Now that the theoretical perspective has been outlined, it is important to see where the Court's approach presently falls short. There are different types of cases in which it can be seen that the Court does not take the bifurcation (between scope and justifi cation) particularly seriously. The purpose of this section is to discuss some examples that represent the Court's various approaches. Three types of cases will be discussed. First, there is a range of cases in which the Court does not address or ignores the fi rst, defi nitional stage. In the second sort of cases the Court does pay some attention to the stage of defi nition, though it does so in such a summary way that it can hardly be considered a proper discussion of the defi nition of the right in question. The fi nal type of case is one where the Court confuses or merges the fi rst and second stage, taking both stages together in a single test.
Cases in which the ECtHR does not address the issue of defi nition of rights
In the fi rst set of cases, the Court acknowledges that there is an issue in the definitional stage that should be addressed; however, the Court, in the end, fails or refuses to go into the matter. The case of Molka v. Poland 40 provides an illustration of this approach. In this case, the Court paved the way for an answer to the question whether a positive obligation existed, though it explicitly refused to answer that question. The litigation concerned a man in a wheelchair who had been unable to vote, since the polling station was not accessible to the disabled. The question was whether the failure to provide appropriate access to the polling station constituted a breach of article 8 of the Convention. After reiterating some precedents the Court continued as follows:
Having regard to the above considerations, the Court does not rule out the possibility that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, a suffi cient link would exist to attract the protection of Article 8. However, the Court does not fi nd it necessary fi nally to determine the applicability of the Article in the present case since, for the reasons which follow, the application is in any event inadmissible on other grounds.
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The Court thus recalled existing principles developed in previous cases, though it failed to apply them to the new situation presented by the applicant. The vague indication that the Court would not rule out the possibility that the applicant's situation falls within the scope of article 8 is not helpful in providing clarity. The individual case might be solved; nonetheless, the Court's decision leaves the reader, at least, with the rather unsatisfactory feeling that no clear answer has been given to the question whether the applicant had a right protected under article 8.
A somewhat similar approach has been adopted by the Court in Maurice v. France . 42 This case concerned a matter of wrongful birth. The applicants claimed that the state did not protect, suffi ciently, the interests of the family; it failed, they asserted, to provide them with a remedy and compensation enabling them to cope with the special burden of a child's disability. After reiterating some very general considerations on the concept of positive obligations, the margin of appreciation, and the subsidiary position of the Court, the Court acknowledged that it had to address the applicability of article 8. Subsequently, however, the Court refused to answer that question and concluded: " [T]he Court does not consider it necessary in the present case to determine that issue since, even supposing that Article 8 may be considered applicable, it considers that the situation complained of by the applicants did not constitute a breach of that provision. "
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Without answering the question of applicability of article 8, the Court thus proceeded on an assumption of applicability. It is unclear how the Grand Chamber can decide, convincingly, whether the limitation of a certain Convention right was legitimate when the scope of the Convention right has not been determined at all. Merely supposing or assuming that an article is applicable cannot take the place of paying proper attention to the defi nition stage; to proceed so is far too indefi nite. The scope of a right provides an indication of the type of limitations that might be allowed. Moreover, it is necessary to determine the obligations for the respondent state before one can actually decide whether they have been violated. Thus, it would have been necessary to discuss the scope of a provision in order to provide, in this particular situation, a convincing and coherent answer to the problem posed by the case at hand.
Within this fi rst set of cases, in which the Court either does not address or ignores the fi rst stage, a closely related range of cases can be distinguished, where a similar approach has been taken by the Court. In these cases, the Court tends to indicate that the applicability of a Convention right is not clear-cut; in other words, it is unclear whether the situation comes within the scope of the provision invoked. In these cases, the Court concludes, however, that the applicability has not been disputed, and, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss the scope of the right in question. An example of this type of case is presented by Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v. Sweden. 44 The applicant in this case claimed that the refusal of the Swedish authorities to permit her to move the remains of her deceased husband to a family grave resulted in a breach of article 8. The Court stated that not every involvement with burials constituted an interference with article 8, yet it continued, surprisingly, with the following considerations:
In the present case, the Government have not disputed that the refusal to allow the removal of the urn involved an interference with the applicant's private life. The Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether such a removal involves the notions " family life " or " private life " cited in Article 8 of the Convention, but will proceed on the assumption that there has been an interference, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. 45 It seems startling that the Court openly acknowledges that a case may raise questions on the scope of article 8, but, given the positions of the parties, refuses 43 Id. § 120. A similar approach has been adopted by the Court in Sentges v. Netherlands (dec.), to answer that question. In this type of case, just as in the cases discussed above, the Court fi nally decides the case purely on the assumption that article 8 is applicable.
In the case of Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom , 46 concerning the conviction of three men for consensual homosexual sadomasochistic activities, the Court even more explicitly expressed its doubts as to whether the situation was covered by the scope of article 8:
The Court observes that not every sexual activity carried out behind closed doors necessarily falls within the scope of Article 8 . . . . [I]t may thus be open to question whether the sexual activities of the applicants fell entirely within the notion of " private life " in the particular circumstances of the case.
However, since this point has not been disputed by those appearing before it, the Court sees no reason to examine it of its own motion in the present case. Assuming, therefore, that the prosecution and conviction of the applicants amounted to an interference with their private life, the question arises whether such an interference was " necessary in a democratic society " within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 8. 47 The Court thus openly doubted whether the activity complained of fell within the scope of article 8, yet it did not address this issue in any more detail because the government did not raise the matter. A particularly problematic aspect of this approach is related to the fact that the defi nition of a Convention article determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide the case. 48 For that reason, this type of question should not be left solely to the position and arguments of the parties. Important procedural aspects should be addressed by the Court ex offi cio , which means that it should always address the question of whether article 8 is applicable to this type of situation in order to determine its own competence to deal with the case. This is even more relevant when the Court expressly doubts whether a certain case falls within the scope of one of the Convention rights.
Cases in which the ECtHR does not explain why the Convention is applicable
The second set of cases is related to the type just described. In these cases, the Court does accept that the case falls within the scope of the Convention article, but it fails to explain why. The examples that will be discussed hereinafter all 46 Laskey Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 Id. § 36.
48 See section 1.
involve article 10, the freedom of expression. This is the main area where the Court has adopted this approach, probably due to the very broad scope of the term " freedom of expression. " Even if a term has a broad scope, the Court should still explain why a case falls within it. If the Court consistently fails to answer that question, a notion such as freedom of expression becomes void of any substance, and it makes it more diffi cult in cases of doubt to determine whether a certain situation is covered by this notion. The following examples illustrate the Court's approach and demonstrate that some substantial explanation and interpretation by the Court can be helpful in understanding the scope of article 10 of the Convention. In the case of Vajnai v. Hungary , 49 the applicant had worn a red star on his jacket during a demonstration. He was convicted for wearing this button, and a relatively light criminal sanction was imposed. In its judgment, the Court immediately jumped to examine the necessity for the interference by the government, thereby implying that wearing a certain button automatically engages protection under the freedom of expression. Precisely why wearing a button, or other forms of " symbolic speech, " constitute a protected form of expression, therefore, remains unclear -the Court did not address that question at all.
A similar approach is seen in the case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria. 50 At issue was the exhibition of an obscene painting in which, among others, a politician was visibly depicted. Without addressing the question whether all forms of artistic expression or satire come within the scope of article 10, the Court considered whether the interference was legitimate. According to the dissenting opinion of Judge Loukis Loucaides, it would have been at least appropriate for the Court to discuss this aspect of the case. While Judge Loucaides somewhat confused the fi rst and second stage as well (he did not really make a distinction between defi ning the scope of article 10 and its application to the facts of the case), he clearly disputed the assumption by the Court that every painting constitutes a protected form of artistic expression. He revealed, thereby, the need for the Court to have dealt with this aspect of the case. It would have been enlightening if the ECtHR had used the opportunity to justify the implicit conclusion in both cases that the situations were covered by article 10. 54 For the development of the interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, it would be informative if the Court indicated on the basis of which element it considered the precedent applicable. That way, the meaning of freedom of expression would become clearer by explaining what the decisive elements are for the Court in considering article 10 applicable in a certain case. The Court, however, hardly paid attention to the applicability phase and simply invoked Müller et al. to justify the applicability of article 10.
It should be clear, by now, in this second type of case, that the Court fails to provide a suffi cient explanation as to why the situation at hand falls within the scope of the right in question. In some cases, this determination occurs by simply omitting the defi nition stage; in others, it is effected by such cursory reasoning that, in effect, the stage of defi nition seems to have been ignored to nearly the same extent as in the fi rst type of case.
Cases in which the ECtHR merges the fi rst and second stages of fundamental rights review
The third and fi nal type of case is one in which the Court confuses or merges the fi rst and second stages. These are mainly cases on positive obligations, such as Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom 55 and Hatton v. United Kingdom. 56 The case of Christine Goodwin marked the end of a line of cases in which, for over a decade, transsexuals had tried to obtain the right to legal recognition of their change of gender. 57 In all of these cases, the applicants claimed that the authorities failed to respect their private life by not allowing their gender change to be implemented in the register of births, which meant that, for legal purposes, they retained the gender they had had before the operation. 53 Müller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) . 54 The Court intended to refer to a paragraph that does not deal with the type of expression, but only to a paragraph stating that the imposition of a fi ne can constitute interference with article 10 and that such has to be justifi ed in accordance with article 10 § 2. Id. § 28. The question in these cases, basically, was whether the time was ripe to impose a positive obligation on states to ensure legal recognition of gender change. In trying to answer that question, the Court in Christine Goodwin mixed the discussion of the meaning and essence of article 8 -elements typical of the fi rst, defi nitional stage -with references to typical elements of the second stage, namely, the margin of appreciation and the fair balance test. The Grand Chamber concluded that there was no longer a fair balance between the individual interest in having the gender change legally recognized and the public interest in maintaining the current system. Therefore, the matter no longer fell within the margin of appreciation of the states. What the Court seems to have done in this case is to incorporate a balancing exercise into the defi nition of the scope of article 8 in relation to transsexuals. The Court defi ned the positive obligation under article 8 so as to ensure legal recognition of gender change by " weighing " the public hardship against the individual hardship. This weighing of interests is an exercise that is characteristic of the second phase, in which the Court tries to establish whether a certain interference is necessary in a democratic society.
58 From a theoretical perspective, however, it is strange to conclude that the existence of a fundamental right depends on public interests -such interests are only relevant within the context of the justifi cation of a limitation of fundamental rights.
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This confusing approach was also adopted in Hatton v. United Kingdom . 60 In this case, the applicants complained about sleep disturbance as a result of night fl ights at Heathrow Airport. In the applicants ' view the national authorities were under a positive obligation to ensure that their rights under article 8 would not be violated. The Grand Chamber acknowledged that there is no explicit right to a clean and quiet environment in article 8 but held that, in case of aircraft noise, an issue may arise under article 8. 61 Without answering the question whether article 8 was applicable to the case at hand, the Court recalled its subsidiary position and claimed that the state enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in these cases. 62 It also emphasized that it had to assess the policy decisions by the government:
The Court considers that in a case such as the present one, involving state decisions affecting environmental issues, there are two aspects to the inquiry which may be carried out by the Court. assess the substantive merits of the government's decision, to ensure that it is compatible with Article 8. Secondly, it may scrutinise the decisionmaking process to ensure that due weight has been accorded to the interests of the individual. In relation to the substantive aspect, the Court has held that the State must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation.
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As these considerations show, the Court in this case did not emphasize that it needed, fi rst, to consider the applicability of article 8. Leaving that question unanswered, it only discussed whether article 8 had been violated and focused on achieving a fair balance between the governmental policy decisions and the individual interest. The conclusions are limited to this specifi c case, since the Court confi ned itself to the particular circumstances of the case and did not address the more abstract question of whether a right to a clean and quiet environment could be read into article 8. Thus the judgment does little to clarify the proper interpretation of article 8. 
Conclusion
It has become clear, by now, that the Court in its adjudicative approach to fundamental rights cases does not always pay attention to the bifurcation between the defi nition of scope and the examination of justifi cation. In the fi rst and second type of cases, the problem is that the Court does not address the defi nition stage properly. In these cases it tries to answer the question whether a limitation to a Convention right is justifi ed without adequately defi ning the right. In the third type of cases, the Court determines the scope of the Convention right by including public interests and other elements typical of the application stage. This case-based approach thus puts a strong emphasis on the so-called second stage and, thereby, on the specifi cs of individual cases.
As examples from its case law have shown, the Court's approach differs from the theoretical approach discussed in section 2. Does this give rise to negative consequences or specifi c problems? The following section will address this question.
Problematic consequences of the Strasbourg Court's approach
Introduction
The Strasbourg Court is a special court in many respects. In principle, and from a purely legal perspective, the Court must be regarded as a supranational court. 66 Although there is some legal debate regarding the erga omnes effect, the actual legal effect of Strasbourg case law is limited to the concrete circumstances of each case.
67
In practice, however, the status of the Court's case law reaches far beyond the individual case decided. The Court has, by now, created an impressive body of case law, in which the rights contained in the Convention are interpreted and applied in an authoritative manner and which are regarded, generally, as authoritative. 68 Several scholars have even argued that the Court may now be characterized as a constitutional or, at least, a semiconstitutional court. 69 This classifi cation is of great importance. The characterization of a supranational court as a constitutional court has an immediate, complicating effect on the dialogue with national constitutional courts. 70 The " new " constitutional court may be regarded as a rival court, and the natural reaction of the national constitutional court may be to resist any disputable judgments the newcomer hands down. 71 In addition, the Court is not organically embedded in national constitutional systems. Rather, it has been imposed upon states parties as an alien body that may be diffi cult to incorporate into existing legal structures and traditions. It is, therefore, not surprising when national legal systems have diffi culties coping with judgments handed down by the Court.
In this context, the Court may be able to maintain its important supervisory position only if the national courts continue to accept its judgments as authoritative explanations of the Convention. 72 For that reason, the Court will have to 65 This is true not only with regard to the application of fundamental rights in individual cases but also in connection with the development and use of argumentation strategies and procedural methods. If insuffi cient guidance is given in this respect, the states may be inclined to follow their own paths. 74 In the end this may harm the supervisory and constitutional position of the Court, and it may hamper the effective and uniform protection of the rights contained in the Convention. 73 Cf. Greer, supra note 69, at 686. 74 This risk is not entirely theoretical, as is clear from a judgment rendered by the German Constitutional Court in 2004, in which it stressed that it considers the German Basic Law to be of higher order than the ECHR, which means that in situations of real confl ict between a Strasbourg interpretation of the Convention and one of the rights guaranteed by the Basic Law, the Basic Law will prevail (Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court], Oct 14, 2004, docket number 2 BvR 1481/04, available at http :// www . bundesverfassungsgericht . de , in particular at para. 35). German scholars have commented that this judgment may not be as revolutionary as it seems. Schaffarzik has stressed, for example, that confl icts between the interpretation by the ECtHR and the national law will be rare, and that, moreover, article 53 of the Convention leaves suffi cient scope for " a higher level of protection " of fundamental rights on the national level (B. Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfassungsgerichts , D IE Ö FFENTLI-CHE V ERWALTUNG 860, 863 (2005)). Since the Constitutional Court decided that deviations from the ECtHR's case law would only be permissible if such would be necessary to protect constitutional rights in Germany, there would be no real confl ict between the Convention and the national law ( id. , at 863). Dörr has argued that the issue of a different national interpretation or application will, in fact, only occur if the facts of the case have changed (O. Dörr, Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen nationalen und europäischen Verfassungsgerichten , D EUTSCHES V ERWALTUNGSBLATT 1088, 1097 (2006) ). Furthermore, the president of the German Constitutional Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, has stated that the judgment has resulted in " a considerable increased effect of the Convention as compared with previous practice, " rather than the opposite (Hans-Jürgen Papier, Execution and Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the Perspective of German National Courts , 27 H UMAN R TS . L.J. 1, 2 (2006); cf. also Dörr, supra , at 1092). Such arguments notwithstanding, it may be remarked that the result of the judgment, still, is that real interpretive clashes between the German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR will not be solved in favor of the supranational court, but in favor of the (lower) (2005)). For this reason and to this extent, the judgment discloses potential rivalry between the two highest courts. This is important, since the German decision appears to have raised the question in other states whether the decisions of the Court should always be implemented. See ' Das tut mir weh ' , interview with the president of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber , in D ER S PIEGEL , 15 November 2004, at 52 (disclosing that Turkey and Poland have actually approached the ECtHR with this question). It is also important to note that the ECHR, different from EC law, does not have direct effect in the states parties. See also Ress, supra note 65, at 376 (mentioning that the Austrian Constitutional Court has stated that " there is still a difference between the Convention as a part of the constitution and the Convention as an international treaty interpreted by the ECtHR. Within the domestic legal order, the Convention is only one element in the mosaic of different constitutional provisions and its interpretation in that context may differ considerably from an interpretation based on the Convention alone " ). The superior status of the judgments of the ECtHR is far from fi rmly established.
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In our view, the approach taken by the Court with respect to the bifurcation between the defi nition of scope and the examination of the justifi cation for an interference falls short of the dual need to provide guidance and to interpret the Convention in an authoritative manner. In this section, we will elaborate on this statement by discussing three problematic consequences of the Court's approach. First, we will argue that, on a substantive level, the case-based approach of the Court and the lack of attention it pays to the defi nition of fundamental rights is undesirable, because it allows the Court to hide behind the specifi c circumstances of the case and to avoid having to make structural decisions on the scope of a Convention right (section 4.2). Second, we submit that the confusion of the two stages of review creates uncertainty regarding the allocation of the burden of proof, both at the level of the Strasbourg Court and at the national level (section 4.3). Third, and fi nally, we fi nd that the lack of attention to the bifurcation between scope and justifi cation causes problems in connection with the margin of appreciation doctrine (section 4.4).
Consequences for the scope of fundamental rights
As seen in section 3, the ECtHR places much emphasis on the second application-and-justifi cation stage, much less on the defi nition stage. The heavy reliance on justifi cation results in a case-based approach in which the bifurcation is not always properly respected. 75 This can affect the soundness of the Court's reasoning, which has been shown by the examples discussed in section 3. This section will focus on the problematic consequences of this approach, not only for national courts and authorities but for Strasbourg itself.
The Court's approach as it has been outlined in section 3 is strongly infl uenced by the special position of the ECtHR. In sections 1 and 4.1, we have already made reference to the Court's supranational character and to the need for it to earn and continue to hold its specifi c position in the European legal landscape. The Court must search, constantly, for a balance between, on the one hand, its subsidiary position vis-à-vis the member states and, on the other, its aim to interpret the Convention and provide effective protection to individuals. This is a diffi cult position, especially since the confi dence of the member states in the Court matters a great deal to the effectiveness of the judgments of the Court. 76 In this context, the Court's case-based approach is understandable indeed. The focus on the facts of the case placed before it allows the Court to take " incremental steps in specifi c contexts rather than . . . dramatic leaps in 75 See , on the case-based approach of the Court: Gerards, supra note 1, at 9; Matscher, supra note 10; Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-restraint The special position of the Court might also explain why the Court does not always respect the bifurcation between defi nition and justifi cation. Its current approach allows the Court to focus on the specifi cs of each individual case and, as it were, to hide behind them. 79 Paying proper attention to the defi nition stage might, in some cases, require the Court to make structural decisions, while these can be avoided or, at least, be left implicit by focusing on the individual case. 80 The possibility of avoiding these choices allows the Court to take a modest position in the constitutional landscape and to maintain, carefully, the balance that has been described above. It enables the Court to take gradual steps and not to force itself upon all member states.
The downside to this approach is that it affects the semiconstitutional or guiding function of the Court. National courts and authorities are frequently left in doubt about the precise scope and meaning of the Convention and often must give their own interpretation to the Convention provisions. After all, in current Court practice, frequently, the scope of rights is determined by taking into account elements that are highly case-specifi c, which makes it more diffi cult to deduce general or abstract conclusions from the precise elements of the case.
The effect of this approach is not only that national authorities do not receive enough guidance; the approach of the Court also sets a bad example for judicial decision making on the level of the states. Unfortunately, inspiring the national authorities with its approach can also work against Strasbourg. Member states can use the same case-based approach to evade their Convention obligations. If the Court strongly focuses on the characteristics of the individual case, then national authorities can also focus on these characteristics to escape Convention obligations they do not want to abide by. This provides states with an excuse to say that the particular situations they are dealing with are to be distinguished from the case law of the Court and, in their view, do not fall within the scope of the Convention. Such a development might frustrate the implementation and effectiveness of the ECHR. In the end, and as a result, even more cases might fi nd their way to Strasbourg, which would put still more pressure on the already overburdened Court.
The national authorities can be provided with more guidance if the Court pays more attention to the bifurcation. The defi nition stage will then be separated from the justifi cation stage, which ensures that application to the facts of 77 Id. 78 On the willingness to draw general conclusions, see Gerards, supra note 1, at 424 -425. 79 Id. at 420. 80 Mahoney, supra note 75, at 77 (explicitly confi rming that the Court will avoid deciding some general issues if there is no need to decide them in the particular case). the case will be concentrated in the second phase. Defi ning the scope of the right on its own merits will provide national authorities with more indications as to how to interpret the Convention. More transparency in the choices made by Strasbourg could surely enhance the implementation of the Convention at national level. That would be benefi cial both on an abstract level and -in the end -on the level of the individual applicant. If the understanding of the Convention is improved at national level this might have the result of fewer individuals fi nding their way to Strasbourg. Indeed, the current number of applications and, particularly, the fact that about 60 percent of these applications are repetitive may be considered an indication that the national states are in need of more guidance from Strasbourg.
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Would this change of approach upset the balance the Court is trying to maintain? Probably not, since the bifurcated approach would just divide the different roles of the Court between the different stages. In the defi nition stage, the Court can guide member states on the proper interpretation of the Convention, while national differences and the subsidiary position could play a more prominent role at the justifi cation stage. The emphasis on the bifurcation would thus still enable the Court to maintain the balance.
Consequences for the burden of proof
One of the most important arguments in favor of the bifurcation in fundamental rights cases is that it ensures a fair division of the burden of proof. 82 In the fi rst or defi nition stage, the applicant must demonstrate that the complaint concerns a fundamental right and that it actually comes within the scope of that right. 83 The applicant must take this fi rst step in order to overcome the presumption of the validity of state action. 84 If the applicant succeeds, a prima facie case of an infringement of the Convention is established. 85 As a consequence of this, the burden shifts to the government in the second or application stage; the state must then refute the assumption of a Convention violation by proving that the interference was justifi ed.
86
Before going into the question of whether the organization of the burden of proof before the Strasbourg Court corresponds to this view, it is necessary to 81 Explanatory report to Protocol 14, CETS no. 194, 12 May 2004, § 7 . See also Alkema, supra note 75, at 60 (confi rming that states are often in need of guidance from the Court). explain some theoretical notions that may help to understand the case law approach of the European Court. In the literature, a distinction is made between two concepts of the burden of proof. 87 The burden of proof is a term that is employed, generally, to refer to the burden of producing evidence. 88 It means that the party bearing this burden fi rst must produce evidence supporting its claim. The second element of the burden of proof is regularly referred to as the burden of persuasion. 89 According to Tobias Thienel, this means that " if the factual contentions of the party bearing the burden of proof are not in the end proved to the appropriate standard, that party will lose on the relevant point. "
90 In the view of Faigman this meaning of the burden of proof is used to " describe the allocation of the responsibility of demonstrating issues of constitutional concern between the parties. "
91 Rüdiger Wolfrum approaches both concepts differently and refers to two different stages in the burden of proof.
92 First, he states that the production phase is concerned with who should produce evidence. 93 The second phase is the assessment phase, in which the party bearing the burden of proof will lose if the court is not convinced that the assertions have been proven.
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Although the descriptions differ, the bottom line of all of these distinctions is the same; there is one element that deals with the burden of producing evidence, and another that deals with the consequences of failure to prove a certain claim.
In proceedings before the ECtHR, the burden of proof or the burden of producing evidence does not play a signifi cant role in the sense that it is not placed strictly on either party. 95 An explanation for this may be found in the nature of the proceedings before the Court. The complaints in Strasbourg always concern state action or the lack thereof. As a result, certain kinds of evidence might be impossible for an individual to obtain, because they are exclusively in the hands of the government. 88 Thienel, supra note 84, at 545; Kokott, supra note 87, at 150. 89 Faigman, supra note 5, at 1523; Kokott, supra note 87, at 150; Thienel, supra note 84, at 548. 90 Thienel, supra note 84, at 548. material, " whether it originates from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, and, if necessary, obtains material proprio motu . "
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The burden of persuasion, by contrast, does play an important role in Strasbourg proceedings. 98 It is not an issue on which the Court has expressed itself explicitly, 99 although it may be inferred from its case law that the responsibility for failing to show the applicability of the Convention or a failure to show that an interference has occurred clearly lies with the applicant. 100 On the other hand, a failure to show that an interference is warranted by a " pressing social need " is the responsibility of the respondent government.
101 It seems beyond doubt that the burden of persuasion lies with the applicant to show the applicability of the Convention. The burden of persuasion on the state seems to depend on the type of right concerned, or, in the words of Thienel, it " depends on the logical relationship of the human right at issue and the limitations provided for it in the Convention. "
102 Within the range of cases pertaining to articles 8 through 11, the burden of persuasion is usually placed on the respondent state.
103 It is in the context of the division of the burden of persuasion -between applicant and respondent state -that the lack of respect for the bifurcation can have negative consequences.
The burden of persuasion is closely connected to the division between the fi rst and second stages discussed in this paper. The presumption of the legality of state action results in the burden of persuasion being placed on the applicant in the fi rst stage, which means that the applicant must prove that the provision is applicable and that there has been an interference. 104 In the second stage, in line with the text of provisions 8 through 11 in the Convention, the state is obliged to prove the justifi cation for the interference.
In section 3, it has been shown that the Court often either ignores or insuffi ciently deals with the defi nition stage or that it mixes the two stages. Due to the connection between the structure of Convention rights and the burden of persuasion, these approaches affect the latter as well. Without properly addressing both stages, the allocation of the burden of persuasion is muddled, and it becomes unclear who should bear this burden. This state of affairs also constitutes a problem from the perspective of the guiding role of the Court. If the Court fails to respect the different adjudicative stages and, as a consequence, fails to provide guidance to the national courts on the allocation of the burden of persuasion, national courts are very much left on their own. The risk is that Strasbourg's nebulous approach will be copied by national courts in their application of the Convention, which might result in undesirable confusion regarding the burden of persuasion at national level.
Another problematic consequence of an unclear burden of persuasion has been described by Faigman. 105 The crux of the problem is that when the division of the burden of persuasion becomes unclear an unequal burden might be placed on the parties. According to Faigman, this is generally to the detriment of the individual applicant. Confusion of the two stages leads to confusion regarding the type of argument that plays a role in each phase. This could mean that governmental interests are taken into consideration when defi ning the scope of the right.
106 Generally, the applicant is required to bear the burden of persuasion in showing the applicability of a fundamental right; however, this becomes an increasingly heavy, if not impossible, burden if governmental interests are incorporated in this stage. Instead of the government's having to show that its interests justify an interference, the applicant must refute the public interest as a relevant argument for determining the scope of the provision. In the case law of the European Court, this risk is mainly visible in cases concerning positive obligations, where it is unclear in which phase the meaning of the right is established. As a result, public interests in some cases play a role in defi ning the scope of the rights in question. Consequently, applicants in individual cases might be held responsible for failing to show that a certain public interest does not render the provision inapplicable. This can be detrimental for the effective protection of individuals.
In cases concerning both negative and positive obligations, the preferable approach would be one in which, fi rst, the defi nition of the right is spelled out and, subsequently, the justifi cation for the interference in the case is considered. The burden of persuasion would then be clearly divided. Such an approach would enhance the consistency in fundamental rights adjudication at both the Strasbourg and the national level and avoid detrimental consequences to the effectiveness of fundamental rights protection. In section 5, this solution will be explored further.
Consequences for the margin of appreciation doctrine
Like many national courts, the European Court of Human Rights usually shows a certain degree of deference toward the national authorities. It does so by leaving the national authorities a " margin of appreciation, " which may be quite narrow or rather wide depending on the circumstances of the case. The primary justifi cation that the Court has given for its margin of appreciation doctrine is that the national authorities, usually, are better placed than the European Court to assess the necessity of certain limitations of fundamental rights. 107 In addition, the doctrine enables the Court to pay respect to the primacy of the national authorities in protecting fundamental rights.
108 Because of this rationale it is not surprising that the doctrine usually comes into play when the appropriateness and reasonableness of a justifi cation are examined, or if the Court is asked to give an opinion about the proportionality of a certain national measure.
109 These standards all require some opinion to be given about national policy decisions and about the necessity and appropriateness of certain measures to pursue important public interests.
Given the Court's subsidiary position it is reasonable that the Court goes to some lengths in respecting the national authorities ' opinions as regards the justifi ability of limitations. It would be rather strange, nonetheless, if the doctrine were applied to the defi nitional stage of the Court's review. 110 From the Convention provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Court it may be concluded that the Strasbourg Court is entrusted with the fi nal authority to interpret the Convention. According to article 32 of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. It is contested whether this jurisdiction means that the example of the recognition of a " defi nitional margin of appreciation " can be found in the notorious case of Vo v. France , in which the Court fl atly refused to give an autonomous defi nition of the right to life. 121 The Court considered that there are so many different opinions within the Council of Europe that it would not be possible for it to rule in an authoritative manner on when the right to life begins. Instead, the Court left an interpretative margin of appreciation to the states, which means that they can now decide for themselves how the scope of the right to life should be defi ned. The result is that the right to life of unborn children is protected in some states, and not in others. 122 However, even though this case is of great importance for the applicability of the margin of appreciation doctrine to the stage of rights defi nition, it may be argued that it is a specifi c and probably unique decision.
123 After all, the case concerned a right that is absolute in character, except for some highly specifi c exemptions. As a result, the Court was confronted with a dilemma -if it had ruled that the right to life starts at birth, it would have offended national sensibilities in quite a number of states, whereas it would have ruled out any possibility of allowing abortion if it had said the right to life starts at conception.
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Because of the specifi c nature of the right to life and the intense controversy surrounding the issue of abortion, this judgment may be considered an unrepresentative exception to the rule that no margin is given with respect to the defi nition of fundamental rights.
Perhaps rather unexpectedly, however, the Court also frequently applies the margin of appreciation doctrine to the defi nition of the scope of nonabsolute fundamental rights. Examples of this are relatively rare where negative interferences with fundamental rights are concerned; 125 however, they are abundant in cases concerned with positive obligations. In section 3, we have already discussed the case of Hatton v. United Kingdom , concerning sleep disturbance caused by night fl ights at Heathrow airport.
126 According to the applicants, the national authorities had insuffi ciently investigated sleep disturbance by aircraft noise and had failed to set reasonable limits on nightly air traffi c. It may be repeated, here, that the Court did not expressly fi nd that article 8 was applicable to claims about sleep disturbance, restricting itself to stating that " Article 8 may apply in environmental cases . . . " and that " [r]egard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole. "
127 Interestingly, the Court subsequently left a margin of appreciation to the national authorities to defi ne the positive obligations inherent to article 8:
Whilst the State is required to give due consideration to the particular interests the respect for which it is obliged to secure by virtue of Article 8, it must in principle be left a choice between different ways and means of meeting this obligation, the Court's supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature and thus limited to reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance.
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In addition, the Court stated that the scope of the margin of appreciation could be determined only by reference to the context of the particular case.
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The Court then tested whether the national authorities had struck a reasonable balance between the individual and governmental interests concerned. In the end, it did not fi nd that " [i]n substance, the authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and home, and the confl icting interests of others and of the community as a whole. "
130 The quoted considerations show that the Court wanted to restrict itself to reviewing the " fairness " of the balance of interests struck by the national government. Although a large part of the judgment is devoted to determining the exact scope of the margin that should be given to the states, the Court did not reach a conclusive judgment on the issue. However, the general result of the Court's approach was that the national authorities were actually given much latitude in determining the scope and meaning of article 8.
Admittedly, it is fully reasonable that the national authorities should be left with a substantial margin of appreciation in determining the need for measures against sleep disturbance, especially since important economic interests 126 were involved, and the case concerned diffi cult issues of social and planning policy. Indeed, the margin of appreciation doctrine is designed precisely to deal with this type of situation. It may be argued, however, that allowing a broad margin of appreciation is reasonable only at the stage of justifi cation , not at the stage of defi ning the rights protected by the Convention. 131 The ECtHR has never given any sound reason why it would consider the national authorities to be " better placed " than itself in defi ning the scope of fundamental rights, or why there is no need for autonomous defi nitions in the sphere of positive obligations. Furthermore, it is far from clear at what point the Court deems the national authorities competent to give an interpretation to the Convention by means of a balancing of interests (which will only be marginally reviewed by the Court) and when it will take over and establish its own autonomous and uniform interpretation. For national courts that have to apply Convention rights, the case law about the margin of appreciation and autonomous interpretation of the Convention may be incomprehensible indeed.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court seems inclined to allow a considerable margin of appreciation in almost every case concerning positive obligations, regardless of the importance of the individual right at stake. In cases that deal with negative obligations, the Court fi rst defi nes the individual right that has been interfered with (although, as demonstrated in section 3, it often pays little attention to the defi nition), and only then will it consider the justifi cation. The intensity of the Court's scrutiny of the justifi cation will be in line with the margin of appreciation that is left to the state. The margin of appreciation itself is determined by a number of factors, one of which is the nature of the affected individual right.
132 This is clearly apparent in article 10 cases, in which the Court considers it relevant to the margin of appreciation that a core aspect of the right has been limited (such as freedom of the press).
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In such cases, stricter scrutiny will be applied than if only the periphery of the right has been affected (as in cases about commercial speech that the defi nition of the right is, normally, considered to be of value to the scope of the margin of appreciation and the intensity of the Court's justifi cation test. It is, therefore, rather curious that, in many cases about positive obligations, the individual right is not at all defi ned. The meaning of the Convention rights in these cases seems to depend on the reasonableness of the balance struck at the national level between the various interests, a balance that is itself scrutinized often rather marginally. 135 Exactly how the margin of appreciation is determined in these cases is unclear; 136 regardless, it will be quite diffi cult to take the importance of the individual right into account if no such right is defi ned in the fi rst place. This is all the more problematic since the importance of the individual right concerned might invite the application of a stricter test, which means that the national balancing of interests will be examined more critically. It is not improbable that, at least in some cases, a different outcome would be reached if the individual right concerned were expressly recognized and defi ned as a fi rst step.
137 The Court's confusion between the fi rst and second stage of fundamental rights review thus hampers a sound application of the margin of appreciation doctrine and, consequently, may result in judicial review that is not suffi ciently strict. 1359 , 1373 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000 (stating that, in general, the test applied in cases about positive obligations is a general balancing test that is generally not very strict, that is somewhat rashly applied, and that is much more vague than the test applied to negative obligations). 136 In fact, it is often noticed that (generally) the margin of appreciation allowed in cases about positive obligations is rather broad -see, e.g., Sudre, supra note 135, at 1369 (although this is debated, see, e.g., Clare Ovey, The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention , 19 H UM . R TS . L.J. 10 (1998)). Interestingly, the example of Hatton makes clear that the Court is well aware of the problem; in this case, the Court did pay attention to the individual interests concerned in determining its margin of appreciation. Unfortunately, in the end it did not provide any clarity as regards the ambit of the margin of appreciation, since it considered that the margin was closely linked to the facts of the case at hand ( Hatton , (103) (104) . This is a general problem regarding the margin of appreciation doctrine; it occurs altogether too often that the Court leaves the question as to the scope of the margin undecided ( cf. G ERARDS , supra note 132, at 196). We will leave this issue aside in our paper since the problem is not closely related to the Court's structural confusion. 137 Cf. the dissenting opinion of (former) Judge Martens in Cossey , in which he also makes clear that it may make a difference to the structure of the Court's review and to the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine whether the case is framed as a case concerning positive obligations or as a case concerning a negative interference (Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990) . In most cases it is rather easy to defi ne the case in both ways ( cf . Sudre, supra note 35 at 1362). This means that the same claim might invite a stricter test if defi ned as a negative interference than if defi ned as a failure to respect positive obligations. It is clear that there is no logical or reasonable explanation to be given for such a difference in approach. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Wildhaber in Stjerna v. Finland, 299-B E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) and see, critically, Sudre, supra note 135, at 1374. levels and to conduct only a limited amount of research into sleep disturbance patterns.
139 Thus, the question to be answered at this stage is whether due respect for the established Convention right would have demanded a certain action from the authorities. In deciding this, the Court could allow a margin of appreciation to the national authorities in order to accommodate their particular needs and abilities in evaluating facts and making policy choices.
Such a two-stage approach, which should also be applied by the national courts, would enhance the quality of both national and transnational or supranational argumentation in fundamental rights cases. It would provide clarity about the respective roles of national and supranational courts regarding both the way in which fundamental rights should be applied by the courts and the division of the burden of proof. In the complex world of human rights law that would be benefi cial to all parties concerned. 139 Cf. Sudre, supra note 135, at 1374, who explains that it would be desirable to use the term " interference " not only in the negative sense ( i.e., to describe an active interference with a right) but also in a positive sense ( i.e., to describe inaction by the state that allegedly results in a lack of protection of a fundamental right). Sudre refers to " normalisation méthodique ensuite: pour toute ingérence, qu'elle que soit active où passive, la Cour devrait rechercher si les conditions fi gurant dans la clause d'ordre public (base légale, but légitime, nécessité) sont remplies [standardization of methodology so that, for any interference -be it active or passive, the Court should ascertain whether the conditions contained in the law and order clause (legal foundation, legitimate aim, necessity) have been met]. "
